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ABSTRACT 
 
This work is approached through the lens of compliant security 
by drawing on the concepts of neutralization theory, a 
prominent postulation in the criminology domain and the ‘big 
five’ personality construct. This research is conducted based on 
a case study of ISO/IEC27001 Standard certified banks, to 
empirically evaluate the link between cybersecurity protocols 
violation and how employees rationalise security behaviour. We 
propose that compliance-based security has the propensity for a 
heightened sense of false security and vulnerability perception; 
by showing that systemic security violation in compliance-
based security models can be explained by the level of linkages 
from the personality construct and the neutralization theory. 
Building on the survey responses from banking organization 
employees and the application of partial least square structural 
equation modelling (PLS-SME) analysis to test the hypotheses 
and validate survey samples, we draw a strong inference to 
support the importance of individual security scenario effect as 
a vital complementary element of compliance-based security. 
Based on our initial findings, conceptual principles and 
practical guidelines for reducing insider threats and improving 
employees’ compliance is presented. We then suggest how 
information security protocol violations can be addressed in that 
context.   
 
Keywords: Information security, standards and compliance, 
personality traits, compliant security behaviour, rationalization 
theory, PLS-SEM, Insider threats 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The ubiquitous and interconnected nature of information 
systems, coupled with the ever-increasing cyber-capabilities of 
adversaries, means that information security (IS) is central to 
the protection, dependability and management of information 
assets for businesses and organizations. Banking and financial 
organizations operate in a dynamic and complex environment 
where risk management is an endless game between system 
defenders and adversaries, such that, threats to critical assets 
could compromise capital gains, human resource, time and 
competitive advantage for businesses. To protect information 
assets and ensure business continuity, organizations take 
measures to reduce the risk of security breaches by 
implementing information security guidelines and protocols. In 
response to the increase in cyber security incidents on critical 
infrastructures, industry regulators make it a mandatory 
requirement for operators to implement security policies in 
accordance with industry standards and regulations. For 
instance, under the Executive Order 13636, the US Federal 
Government introduced a technical framework and regulation 
aimed at protecting critical national infrastructure (CNI) 
cybersecurity and buildings. Likewise, the EU put forward a 
proposal for a specific European Directive relating to the CNI 
operators, in both private and public enterprises for the 
management and regulation of cybersecurity issues [1]. In 
banks and financial organizations, information security risk is 
part of the overall management of operational risk. Any failure 
to implement appropriate security controls is considered a 
compliance issue, which can attract sanctions from industry 
regulators. Compliant security is the acceptance of external 
entity in the form of corporate governance, legislative and 
industry regulations. However, compliance-based security is 
determined by factors like the level of organisation security 
control requirements, the adoption, application and 
interpretation of different standards within the context of 
specific need [2]. One of such standards is the ISO/IEC27001, 
which is particularly relevant to this work and how it is applied 
in a regional case study. 
 
The ISO/IEC27001 is an international standard for best 
practices for Information Security Management Systems 
(ISMS), which outline comprehensive requirements for 
safeguarding organisation information assets. It defines baseline 
requirements and controls which can be used to assess risk 
under the principle of confidentiality, integrity and availability 
[3]. However, the ISO Standard does not address how to capture 
the thought process of system adversaries. Also, the standard 
does not specify, name or recommend any method of control for 
a given risk scenario but only provides a generic risk analysis 
and risk treatment plan that is applicable to all typ es of 
organizations. Although standardisation and regulatory 
demands play an important part in attracting budgets and 
attention of C-level executives in the areas of information 
security, there are increasing challenges to balance real 
information security threats with compliance requirements, 
thereby leading to a heightened false sense of security and 
vulnerability perception. In today’s fast-paced threat 
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environments, the reality is that organizations can meet 
compliance requirement without necessarily being secured. 
Hence, the natural research question is why compliance-based 
information security is considered a far-fetched approach? The 
rest of this paper is organised as follows; Section 2 covers the 
motivation for this study and related work. Research model and 
hypotheses are described in section 3. In section 4, research 
method, including the validation of measurement and test of 
hypotheses are presented. Implications of this study outcome 
for organisations are discussed in section 5, while section 6 
focuses on how to mitigate information security compliance-
gaps. Finally, discussion and conclusion are covered in section 
7, where the key findings and proposition for future work is 
presented. 
 
 
 
2.  RELATED WORK AND THE MOTIVATION 
 
The first challenge of information security management in 
banking organizations is the balance of incentives for the 
optimal mitigation of cybersecurity risks. Cybersecurity 
economic model suggests that depending on a combination of 
incentives, organisation policymakers may eventually stop 
investing in risk assessment and only focus on compliance-
based security, which could lead to unintended consequences 
[1]. Central to organisation cybersecurity risk evaluation and 
investment decisions are C-level executives; who may not have 
a comprehensive understanding of their organisation security 
capabilities, information assets and threat vectors, yet decide the 
budget for security investment. Most often, not only are C-level 
executives’ understanding of risk tolerance in misalignment 
with the IS risk faced by their organizations [4] but C-level 
executives usually, opt for compliance-based security solutions 
because it is easy to implement [5]. A lot of security discussions  
hubs on why security by compliance is a far-fetched approach 
and why compliance-based security risk management may not 
be appropriate for organizations [6]. For instance, it is 
considered that technology and adversary expertise evolves 
much faster than standards, but the most significant limitation to 
compliance-based security is the human factor. Researchers 
suggest that the human element is the major uncertainty and 
weakest link in any security posture [7], [8], as a consequence 
of lacking information security policies compliance [9]. Apart 
from technical capabilities, the biggest threat to IS, leveraged 
through malicious and unintentional security protocol violation, 
is the human behaviour [10]. There have been suggestions for 
more empirical research to link employee non-compliance with 
psychosocial factors and behavioural theories [11], in attempts 
to explain the reason why employees fail to comply with 
regulations relating to cyber crimes. For instance, [12], [13] 
explored the theory of planned behaviour to argue that 
perceived expectation, attitude and subjective norms are 
indicators of behavioural intention. It is further suggested that 
through training and awareness programs, compliant behaviour 
can be attained. However, training is not sufficient to enforce 
compliance, despite the amount of resources that organizations 
disburse to address security awareness gaps [8]. In the aim to 
enforce compliance, some organizations also introduce 
motivation elements of reward and punish for deliberate non-
compliance, so that employees can be discouraged from 
violating cybersecurity protocols. However, studies [14] have 
shown that deterrence draws on the principle of rational 
behaviour, and information security standards like 
ISO/IEC27001 is also based on the assumption that people fit 
within a certain rational frame of reference. Therefore, contrary 
to rational assumption, deterrence measures sometimes yield 
negative consequences, given that motivation differs across 
organizations [15], [16]. 
 
We approach this work through the lens of personality traits and 
the neutralization theory, to show that the level of systemic risk 
of security protocol violation in compliance-based security 
model can be explained by the level of linkages from the 
personality construct and the neutralization theory. It is believed 
that this study will complement the wider body of information 
security research by highlighting the relevance of personality 
traits and neutralization techniques to compliance-based 
security management. 
 
 
 
3.  RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Our model is comprised of two concepts that are based on the 
personality construct and the neutralization theory. Description 
of the two concepts with respect to this work and the 
hypotheses derived are as follows: 
 
Personality Traits and Security Scenario Effects 
Evidence from the literature has shown that individual 
personality traits described by the big 5 psychological 
constructs of Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, 
Agreeableness and Neuroticism (OCEAN), can reveal a 
significant aspect of behaviour. In the context of information 
security, it is suggested that individuals with the same 
personality traits react differently to the same condition 
depending on associated security scenario effect like self-
efficacy, sanction severity, sanction certainty and response cost 
[17]. Therefore, differences in compliant behaviour intentions 
are based on the cross-level relationship between personality 
types and the way we respond to security scenario effect [18]. 
For instance, as illustrated in Table 1, two different employees 
with agreeable personality and Narcissistic personality are 
likely to violate security protocols, if, under security scenario 
effects, they both show a low sense of sanction certainty.  
 
 
Personality Notation Security Scenario Effect 
Openness O Low sense of sanction 
severity 
Conscientiousness C Low sense of response 
efficacy 
Extraversion E Low sense of threat severity, 
threat vulnerability and 
response cost 
Agreeableness A Low sense of sanction 
certainty 
Narcissism N Low sense of sanction 
certainty 
Table 1: Cross-level interaction between personality traits and 
security scenario effects 
 
Similarly, an employee with openness personality but a low 
sense of sanction severity or another with conscientiousness 
characteristic but a low sense of response efficacy is likely to 
violate security protocols. We, therefore, hypothesize the 
following: 
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H1a: Low sense of sanction severity can negatively affect 
compliant security model 
 
H1b: Low sense of response efficacy can negatively affect 
compliant security model 
 
H1c: Low sense of threat vulnerability can negatively affect 
compliant security model 
 
Neutralization Theory 
Neutralization theory, introduced by [19], suggests that most 
adolescents are dissuaded from activities that violate societal 
norms because of associated guilts and shames. However, in 
order to obtain episodic relief from moral constraint, individuals 
adopt the technique of neutralization to offset their guilt and 
freely engage in delinquency without impacting on their self-
image [20]. Researchers have applied neutralization techniques 
in various forms of rule-breaking or deviance behaviour that are 
not necessarily criminal [21]. Neutralization theory provides 
explanatory insight into how people are able to justify and break 
loose from restrictive societal norms and are able to rationalise 
rule-breaking actions without remorse [22]. Neutralization 
techniques have gained increasing appeal from behavioural 
scientists to understand and mitigate workplace deviance. Five 
neutralization techniques are outlined by [19], which include: 
denial of injury, denial of responsibility, appeal to higher 
loyalties, denial of victims, and condemnation of condemners. 
We considered three neutralization techniques within the 
context of IS and how they influence security protocol 
violation. Firstly, Denial of Responsibility is a technique 
adopted to justify security risk behaviour by acknowledging that 
although certain actions are wrong, the offender claims that the 
situation is forced upon them and they had no choice. This 
could be a case of taking jobs and sensitive corporate data 
home, to meet up with project deadlines. Secondly, the Denial 
of Injury technique is a case whereby an offender admits to the 
violation of security protocol but try to justify his action by 
assuming that, no one is harmed because of his action. A typical 
example of this technique in IS context is the sharing of 
passwords with colleagues. Thirdly, the Blaming the Victim 
technique, an offender acknowledges that there may be 
damaging consequences associated with a risky behaviour, but 
the offender blames the victim e.g. an organisation, a manager, 
a supervisor etc. as the reason for his action. An example of this 
in IS context is the installation of unauthorised software to 
access restricted websites on corporate networks. To counteract 
individual neutralization techniques, it is suggested that training 
and awareness, as well as security culture, can significantly 
improve compliance level in an organisation. We, therefore, 
hypothesize the following: 
 
H2a: Denial of Responsibility negatively affects compliant 
security model 
 
H2b: Denial of Injury negatively affects compliant security 
model 
 
H2c: Blaming the Victim negatively affects compliant security 
model 
 
H3a: Security culture positively affects actual compliance level 
 
 
 
 
4.  RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Survey methodology can be used to study employees’ opinion, 
attitude and behavioural patterns within the context of 
information security [23]. Similar to the data collection method 
described for the same group of banking organizations in our 
previous work [6], we carried out a survey to gain insights into 
how employee risk behaviour affects compliance-based model 
of IS risk management. The survey is designed to capture how 
ISO/IEC27001 certified financial institutions implement 
policies and employees behavioural response within the context 
of information security. The online survey of this work is 
conducted in line with the method described in [23], [24]. 
Survey questions are segmented into 3 sections; knowledge and 
awareness statement, security culture statement and 
demography. The demography of the survey group captures 
survey representatives for segmentation analysis, while the level 
of compliance is measured through security culture statements 
and the knowledge and awareness statements. Security culture 
statement assesses the behavioural pattern of employees, which 
could undermine effective implementation of policies. 
Knowledge and awareness statements test employees’ 
understanding of security policy requirements. Overall, all 
questions are designed to indirectly measure risky behaviour 
due to security scenario effect on personality  traits and link 
responses to neutralization techniques. The recruitment strategy 
for this work is based on a random selection from a presumably  
representative group of bank employees, including 
executive/senior manager level, IT department, Operations, HR 
and administration, and others. Job functions of the ‘others’ 
categories include marketing, accountancy, risk management, 
sales and predictive analysis.  
 
The survey questions follow a Likert scale response model 
(strongly agree, agree, uncertain, disagree and strongly 
disagree), except for the question that captures the survey 
demography. The survey is conducted through Google Forms, 
an online survey application that allows real-time response, 
collation and analysis of data. Respondents take part in the 
survey over a 2 weeks period after the initial invitation via 
emails and after obtaining security clearance from the CISO of 
each bank. The average working years of all respondents is 5 
years and above and the education level for all respondents is 
Bachelor degree and above. Gender is not factored into this 
survey but more emphasis is p laced on the demography in terms  
of respondent’s job functions.  
 
The demography of respondents in terms of representation 
analysis is captured in Figure 1, where 15.8 % of respondents 
are executive/senior manager level officers, 12.3 % of 
respondents are from the IT department, 14 % from HR and 
administration, 40.4 % from Operations and 17.5 % represent 
‘others’ categories. Figure 2 shows the snapshot of the 
compliance level across the survey demography. 
 
76                              SYSTEMICS, CYBERNETICS AND INFORMATICS        VOLUME 15 - NUMBER 5 - YEAR 2017                             ISSN: 1690-4524
 
Figure 1: Demographic characteristics of respondents 
 
 
The survey data is quantified by assigning range values from 1 
to 5 for each survey question, such that, if a statement is true 
from a security standpoint, 5 corresponds to ‘strongly agree’ 
and 1 corresponds to ‘strongly disagree’. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Compliance level 
 
 
In view of the banks’ reluctance to share vulnerability 
information, results are anonymized for subsequent analysis in 
this work. 
 
 
Validation of Measurement 
Validation and reliability test of the result as shown in Table 2 
follows the recommendation of data measurement goodness-of-
fit in the literature [25] [26]. Our data is validated with respect 
to quality and validity criteria methods for instrument item 
validation.  
 
 
Figure 3: Structural Equation Model Results 
 
To ascertain error-free, construct reliability and internal 
consistency of result, we assess values for composite reliability 
index for all constructs, and they are greater than the critical 
threshold of 0.70, indicating adequate reliability for all 
constructs. Similarly, the measure of convergent validity based 
on the average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct 
exceeds the recommended 0.5 threshold criteria. In addition, 
loadings for all indicators are above 0.70, except for DR2 and 
KA1, which are very close to the threshold at 0.69 and 0.64 
respectively. Hence, we conclude that contemporary 
recommendations for the convergent and discriminant validity 
have been met. 
 
 
Latent 
Constructs 
Indicators Loadings Composite 
Reliability 
AVE 
Low sense of 
sanction 
severity  
(LSS) 
LSS1 0.76 0.77 0.63 
LSS2 0.82 
Low sense of 
response 
efficacy (LRE) 
LRE1 0.89 0.85 0.74 
LRE2 0.82 
Low sense of 
threat 
vulnerability 
(LTV)  
LTV1 0.90 0.88 0.78 
LTV2 0.87 
Denial of 
Responsibility 
(DR) 
DR1 0.80 0.72 0.57 
DR2 0.69 
Denial of 
Injury (DI) 
DI1 0.92 0.94 0.88 
DI2 0.95 
Blaming the 
Victim (BV) 
BV1 0.91 0.93 0.86 
BV2 0.95 
Security 
Culture (SC) 
SC1 0.95 0.94 0.88 
SC2 0.92 
Knowledge & 
Awareness 
(KA) 
KA1 0.64 0.79 0.66 
KA2 0.95 
Table 2: Latent Variables validity and reliability measurement 
 
 
Structural Model Analysis 
All hypotheses are tested to measure the effect of neutralization 
and personality traits alongside different variables on the 
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compliance-based security model. Further data analysis is 
conducted with IBM SPSS Statistics 23.0 [27] and SmartPLS 
3.0 [28] packages. In addition, we calculated the t-statistics by 
conducting bootstrapping with 3,000 subsamples. Table 3 
shows the structural model result including the path coefficient 
for all hypotheses and the significance of the path (p-value).  
 
Hypothesis Path 
coefficients 
t-value  p-value  
H1a: LSS Compliant 
security model  
0.45 2.42 n.s. 
H1b: LRE Compliant 
security model 
-0.39* 1.95 P<0.10 
H1c: LTV Compliant 
security model 
-0.68*** 0.18 P<0.01 
H2a:  DR Compliant 
security model 
0.27** 2.47 P<0.05 
H2b:    DI  Compliant 
security model 
1.30*** 3.64 P<0.01 
H2c:  BV Compliant 
security model 
-0.02 0.17 n.s. 
H3a:   SC   Actual 
Compliant Level 
0.91*** 2.99 0.01 
Note: n.s. not significant     
Table 3:  Findings on structural relationship showing path 
loadings and t-values 
 
 
As hypothesized, we found that H1b, H1c, H2a, H2b, and H3a 
are supported, while H1a, H2c are not. This implies that 
compliance-based security model is significantly influenced by 
neutralization techniques, especially DR and DI in this case. 
Similarly, personality traits and cross-level interaction with 
security scenario effects have a direct bearing on the 
effectiveness of compliance-based security model. This result is 
also supported by the results obtained in [22][29], although, this  
work is based on slightly different constructs. 
 
 
 
5. ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS   
 
Findings in this work agree with literature that compliance-
based security is a far-fetched, universal and generic approach 
to IS management. This study highlights the limitations of the 
compliance-based approach to information security and 
particularly reveals how the interplay between personality traits, 
security scenario effects and neutralization techniques can 
undermine the effectiveness of compliance-based security 
management. Individual attributes and norms directly affect the 
behavioural intention to comply with cybersecurity policies and 
guidelines. We test the effect of neutralization technique 
alongside different security scenario effects under the OCEAN 
personality construct and result suggests that, within the context  
of this study, two of the tested neutralization techniques have a 
positive effect on employee behavioural risks that may 
undermine the effectiveness of compliant security. Similarly, 
our result highlights the link of each hypothesis to security 
protocol violations. A possible explanation for the correlation of 
hypotheses in this result is that employees act of deviance is not  
necessarily due to lack of training on IS guidelines, but perhaps, 
more to do with the security implementation approach of each 
organisation.  
 
Although continuous IS training and awareness program for 
employees cannot be overemphasised, our findings suggest that 
training should be delivered in such a way to achieve the most 
impact. For instance, addressing the security scenario effect and 
neutralization technique for a given employee can counteract 
the security gap introduced by the employee’s non-compliant 
behaviour. In addition to compliant security, the training and 
awareness needs of each employee should be tailored such that 
individual personality traits and neutralization techniques are 
factored into organisation policies, guidelines and practical 
security procedures. This can significantly reduce security 
protocol violation under a compliance-based security model. 
 
 
 
6.  FOCUSING ON INFORMATION SECURITY 
COMPLIANCE-GAPS 
 
In this section, we build on the empirical evidence from our 
previous work [30], to propose conceptual principles and 
practical guidelines for the enforcement of employees 
compliant behavioural changes. Based on the insights into how 
security scenario effect and neutralization technique affects 
employee compliant behaviour, we propose that by integrating 
practical security procedures into operational routines, there is a 
greater chance of a positive shift in employees’ perception of 
compliance. Studies have shown that given objective situations 
if security becomes a quotidian practice as well as an integral 
part of an organisation culture, there is a considerable reduction 
in the likelihood of security protocol violations [31]. Using data 
security as an example, in this case, we describe some steps that 
can be taken to mitigate security compliance gaps. All 
traditional enterprises, organizations and government agencies, 
consider data as a critical pervasive asset that requires top 
priority response. As such, most organisations understand the 
need for data security but may not necessarily know how to 
prioritize that for all employees. 
 
The first step to mitigating compliance gaps with respect to dat a 
security starts with the management top hierarchy. As 
illustrated by the compliance-gap mitigation steps shown in 
figure 4, Executive level sponsors should be able to demonstrate 
a commitment to address the threats of information security in 
an organization. Similarly, security and risk management 
leaders should be able to understand and effectively 
communicate regulatory obligations under the data protection 
laws of relevant jurisdictions.  
 
The second step is to embed appropriate technical controls into 
the organization security culture through practical procedures. 
For instance, data protection is a requirement in an organisation 
information security policy, however, data protection policy  
subsets like regular data backups and unauthorized use of 
portable devices on corporate computers can be implemented to 
become a part of an organization work culture. Considering that 
employees may not feel it as a duty to carry out regular data 
backups, depending on how the interplay between neutralization 
technique or security scenario effect influences their compliance 
decisions. However, compliance can be enforced if data backup 
becomes part of the job the functions for all employees. 
 
Technical solutions that can be leveraged as part of data 
security strategy, in this case, may simply be a system or a 
prompt device that enforces/reminds an employee to carry out 
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data backup every day. For instance, if it is impossible for all 
employees that interact with information systems to log off at 
the end of the day without completing backups to the central 
server, then data backups will become one of the practical 
guidelines that improve employees’ information security 
compliance. Data backups will then become practical job 
requirements, rather than an inconvenient security measure. 
Then gradually, other policy subsets can be introduced in 
controlled measures to support compliance. Another practical 
procedure could be the implementation of a system that 
compels users to change passwords at intervals and disabling of 
USB ports on all organisation computers. These measures 
would reduce threats posed by employees that are susceptible t o 
social engineering, reduced the risk of unauthorized copying of 
confidential information and improve overall data security  
compliance. 
 
The third step is compliance monitoring; usually, this should 
have a top-bottom approach, starting with executive level 
management. Through continuous auditing and compliance 
monitoring that involves technical and procedural controls, 
there is a better chance of timely response to identifying and 
managing compliance gaps. The fourth step is to improve 
resilience in order to reduce security protocol violations. By 
identifying compliance gaps, security management programs 
can be set to promote and maintain security  consciousness 
throughout the organization. In the case of data security, 
improving resilience may include heightening the sense of 
ethical responsibility surrounding data disclosure and 
unauthorized alterations. 
 
Figure 4: Compliance-gaps mitigation steps. 
 
The final step involves continuous communication of security 
policy requirements, behavioural guidelines and compliance 
impact on assets and business risks. Policy subsets should show 
clear guidelines and best practices for ensuring data 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Through user 
awareness and ethical code of conduct programs, employees 
should become fully aware of organization’s position on data 
protection; whereby data security is the responsibility of all 
employees and not just restricted to the IT department. Most 
importantly, it should be communicated why data is vital for 
business continuity, how data loss may impact on business and 
what measures can be taken to ensure data security. By 
rewriting data security policy subsets in a clear and concise 
fashion and, by implementing technical solutions that 
complement data protection policy, organisations can begin to 
see data security objectives as part of general security 
compliance scheme. To avoid productivity challenges often 
brought about by extra layers of technical security ; technical 
solutions can be introduced gradually while focusing initially on 
components that constitute everyday security issues. Therefore, 
employees that often see extra security steps as in-convenient 
add-ons, may not be overwhelmed by the perception of reduced 
productivity.  
 
 
 
7. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Human factor continues to represent the weakest link in 
organisations defence postures. The insufficient understanding 
of the dynamics surrounding security compliant behaviour 
grossly underscores that effectiveness of security by 
compliance. We show that, with respect to employee’s 
personality dimension and security scenario effect, Low sense 
of sanction severity (LSS) and Low sense of response efficacy 
(LRE) negatively affects compliant security model. Similarly, 
in the context of neutralization technique, we show that Denial 
of Responsibility (DR) and Denial of Injury (DI) negatively 
affects compliant security model. However, for both personality  
trait and neutralization technique, the results have not been able 
to support hypothesized negative relationship for a Low sense 
of sanction severity (LSS) and Blaming the Victim (BV) 
respectively. 
 
In general, we have shown how individual attributes and norms 
influence the intention to comply with cybersecurity policies 
and guidelines. We also discussed the wider implications of this 
research for organisations, suggesting how the security 
awareness need of each employee could be factored into 
customized training programs. Finally, through a 
conceptualized approach of practical security procedures, we 
addressed the practical problem of how to enforce compliance 
within a banking organisation workforce. It is believed that this 
study will have a wider implication for security managers and 
researchers alike. As part of future work, we hope to expand 
and test the validity of the observations in this study through a 
robust empirical model and also, suggest ways to integrate 
human-centric technical procedure into compliant security 
model.  
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